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Abstract
This paper examines the welfare implications of managing Q with
in￿ ation targeting by monetary authorities who have to "learn" the
laws of motion for both in￿ ation and the rate of growth of Q. Our
results show that the Central Bank can achieve great success in re-
ducing the volatility of GDP growth with basically the same in￿ ation
volatility, if it incorporates this additional target into its policy regime.
However, the welfare e⁄ects are generally lower, in terms of consump-
tion, when the monetary authorithy reacts to Q growth as well as
in￿ ation.
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11 Introduction
The practice of in￿ ation targeting - controlling changes in goods prices - is
accepted by many Central Banks, but there is no consensus about the man-
agement of asset-price in￿ ation, except in the sense that it is not desirable
for asset prices to be too high or too volatile. In general, research indi-
cates that central bankers should not target asset prices [see Bernanke and
Gertler (1999), Gilchrist and Leahy (2002)]. But Cecchetti, Genberg and
Wadhwani (2002) have argued that central banks should "react to asset price
misalignments". In essence, they show that when disturbances are nominal,
reacting to close misalignment gaps signi￿cantly improves macroeconomic
performance. However, this stance of monetary policy is di¢ cult to adopt.
In practice, it is di¢ cult to identify the degree of misalignment, since there
is no clear agreement about the fundamental value of the asset.
In this paper, we consider the rate of growth of Tobin￿ s Q as a potential
target variable for monetary policy. Our reasoning is that Q-growth would be
small when the growth in the market valuations of capital assets corresponds
roughly with the growth of replacement costs. In other words, Q-growth can
serve as a measure of asset price misalignment since there is a correspondence
between volatility and high Q-growth with "excessive" share price volatility
and in￿ ated share prices. An advantage of the focus on the rate of growth
Q is that it obviates the need to know the "fundamental value".
The focus on Q is also in￿ uenced by Brainard and Tobin (1968, 1977),
who argued that Q plays an important role in the transmission of monetary
policy both directly via the capital investment decision of enterprises and
indirectly via consumption decisions. Thus Q has implications for in￿ ation
and growth. Large swings in Q can lead to systematic overinvestment,
and moreover, in the open-economy context, to over-borrowing and serious
capital account de￿cits.
We are concerned with comparing two monetary policy regimes - one in
which the central bank reacts to in￿ ation (when it exceeds the target range)
and the other where the central bank reacts to in￿ ation (when it exceeds
the target range) as well as to Q-growth (when it rises above or falls below
a speci￿ed range). We are also concerned with the welfare implications
of in￿ ation targeting in small open economies. Our interest in small open
economies is a pragmatic one - about twenty countries now practice in￿ ation
targeting and they are small and open.
Following standard methodology we examine the e⁄ects of monetary pol-
icy in a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium framework. But, since our
model is designed to re￿ ect characteristics in small open economies, we pay
speci￿c attention to the traded-goods sectors and to price stickiness via the
2pass-through method (see also Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001)). We will
also concentrate on shocks to the terms of trade since these tend to be more
important than productivity as an underlying driving force for in￿ ation and
for economic ￿ uctuations (see discussion in Mendoza (1995)).1 We have also
opted to keep the comparative analysis simple and straightforward, in this
paper by omitting "output gap" considerations in the policy rule.
We also introduce learning on the part of the monetary authority in that
it does not know the "true laws of motion" of in￿ ation generated by the pri-
vate sector whose behavior is described by a stochastic dynamic, nonlinear
general equilibrium model, with forward-looking rational expectations. In-
stead the central bank has to learn about the laws of motion of in￿ ation from
past data, through continuously updated least squares regression. This in-
formation is then used to obtain an optimal interest rate feedback rule based
on linear quadratic optimization, using weights in the objective function for
in￿ ation which can vary with current conditions. Such a learning framework
accords more closely with real life Central Bank policy setting behavior based
on approximating models of the true economy. The monetary authority is
thus "boundedly rational", in the sense of Sargent (1999), with "rational"
describing the use of least squares, and "bounded" meaning model misspeci-
￿cation. The policy setting framework may also be viewed as an adaptation
of the robust optimal control modelling framework of Hansen and Sargent
(2002).
Thus, we present the implications for two monetary policy scenarios -
in￿ ation targeting with and without reacting to Q-growth - on the welfare of
a small open economy with sticky prices and where the central bank learns
about the nature of the shock and the degree of Q-growth. To anticipate
results, we show that incorporating Q-growth targets with in￿ ation targets
can be very successful for reducing the volatility of GDP growth without
much change in the volatility of in￿ ation. However, for overall welfare, based
on the utility of consumption, targeting Q-growth in addition to in￿ ation
leads to generally lower payo⁄s. Overall welfare has less volatility but is
centered on a lower value than in the case of pure in￿ ation targeting. We
1This issue of Q-growth targeting in smaller open economies may be even more perti-
nent than in industrialized economies. Pacharoni (2003) compared the volatility of the
share market index of emerging market countries relative to G7 and a broader industrial-
ized countries. He found that the volatility of the share prices in these countries to be
much larger than that in the G7 and industrialized countries. He also found the cross-
correlations of the rate of growth of share market indices with GDP growth to be small
and positive for emerging market countries, while they are small and negative for the G7
and industrialized countries. Thus, targeting Q-growth may serve as an indirect means
to stabilise output growth.
3thus show that the speci￿cation of the interest-rate rule can in￿ uence not
just the volatility of welfare, but also the average level of welfare. While
this result may be provocative, we also note that the di⁄erence in the average
level of welfare is not very large.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is described in Section 2,
and the solution algorithm is presented in Section 3. Section 4 contains the
simulation results. The concluding remarks are in Section 5.
2 Model Speci￿cation
The framework of analysis contains two modules - a module which describes
the behavior of the private sector and a module which describes the behavior
of the central bank.
2.1 Private Sector Behavior
The private sector is assumed to follow the standard optimizing behavior
characterized in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models.
2.1.1 Consumption








where C is the aggregate consumption index and ￿ is the coe¢ cient of relative
risk aversion. Unless otherwise speci￿ed, upper case variables denote the
levels of the variables while lower case letters denote logarithms of the same
variables. The exception is the nominal interest rate denoted as i:
The representative agent as ￿household/￿rm￿optimizes the following in-








#t+1+i = [1 + Ct]
￿￿ ￿ #t+i (3)
#t = 1 (4)
where Et is the expectations operator, conditional on information available at
time t; while ￿ approximates the elasticity of the endogenous discount factor
# with respect to the average consumption index, C: Endogenous discounting
4is due to Uzawa (1968). Such discounting is widely used in order to "close"
open-economy models. Mendoza (2000) states that this type of discounting
is needed for the model to produce well-behaved dynamics with deterministic
stationary equilibria.2
The speci￿cation used in this paper is due to Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe
(2001). In our model, an individual agent￿ s discount factor does not depend
on their own consumption, but rather their discount factor depends on the
average level of consumption. Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2001) argue that
this simpli￿cation reduces the equilibrium conditions by one Euler equation
and one state variable, over the standard model with endogenous discount-
ing, it greatly facilitates the computation of the equilibrium dynamics, while
delivering ￿virtually identical￿predictions of key macroeconomic variables
as the standard endogenous-discounting model.3 In equilibrium, of course,
the individual consumption index and the average consumption index are
identical. Hence,
Ct = Ct (5)
The consumption index is a composite index of non-tradeable goods n






























the following expressions give the demand for traded and non-traded goods





















2Endogenous discounting also allows the model to support equilibria in which credit
frictions may remain binding.
3Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2001) argue that if the reason for introducing endogenous
discounting is solely for introducing stationarity, ￿computational convenience￿should be
the decisive factor for modifying the standard Uzawa-type model. Kim and Kose (2001)
reached similar conclusions.
5Similarly, we can express the consumption of traded goods as a composite











where ￿x is the proportion of export goods. The aggregate expenditure














where P x and P m are the prices of export and import type goods respectively.




yields the demand for export and import goods as functions of the aggregate











































where Ax;Am represents the labour factor productivity terms4 in the produc-
tion of export and import goods, and (1￿￿x); (1￿￿m) are the coe¢ cients of
the capital Kx and Km respectively. The time subscripts (t ￿ 1) indicates
that they are the beginning-of-period values. The production of non-traded








Capital in each sector has the respective depreciation rates, ￿x and ￿m;
and evolves according to the following identities:
K
x














t represents investment in each sector.
4Since the representative agent determines both consumption and production decisions,
we have simpli￿ed the analysis by abstracting from issues about labour-leisure choice and
wage determination.
62.1.3 Budget Constraint
The budget constraint faced by the household/￿rm representative agent is:










￿ [Bt ￿ Bt￿1(1 + it￿1)] (21)
where S is the exchange rate (de￿ned as domestic currency per foreign),
L￿
t is foreign debt in foreign currency, and Bt is domestic debt in domestic
















































The aggregate resource constraint shows that the ￿rm faces quadratic ad-












The household/￿rm may lend to the domestic government and accumu-
late bonds B which pay the nominal interest rate i. They can also borrow
internationally and accumulate international debt L￿ at the ￿xed rate i￿; but
this would also include a cost of currency exchange.5
The change in bond holdings and foreign debt holdings evolves as follows:
P
n
t Gt = Bt+1 ￿ Bt(1 + it) (23)
(P
x
t Xt ￿ P
m












The household/￿rm optimizes the expected value of the utility of consump-
tion (2) subject to the budget constraint de￿ned in (21) and (22) and the
constraints in (19) and (20).
5The time-varying risk premium is assumed to be zero.
































































































The variable ￿ is the familiar Lagrangean multiplier representing the mar-
ginal utility of wealth. The terms Qx and Qm; known as Tobin￿ s Q, represent
the Lagrange multipliers for the evolution of capital in each sector - they are






t yields the following ￿rst order conditions:
U


































































































0(Ct+1)(1 + it ￿ ￿t+1) (26)

















































































where ￿pt+1 = log(Pt+1=Pt) is the per period in￿ ation; s is the logarithm
of the nominal exchange rate S and (Etst+1 ￿ st) is the expected rate of
exchange rate depreciation.
Equation (26) is the typical Euler equation for consumption. Using the
utility function in (1) yields the consumption function:
Ct = Et
￿





which shows how current consumption depends on expectations of future
values. Equation (27) describes the interest arbitrage condition and the
forwarding-looking behavior of the exchange rate.
The above equations (28) and (29) also show that the solutions for Qx
t
and Qm
t , which determine investment and the evolution of capital in each
sector, come from forward-looking stochastic Euler equations. The shadow
price or replacement value of capital in each sector is equal to the discounted
value of next period￿ s marginal productivity, the adjustment costs due to the
new capital stock, and the expected replacement value net of depreciation.
Thus the model has four ￿forward-looking￿stochastic Euler equations,
which determine Ct;st;Qx
t;Qm
t These variables, together with (25), in turn
9determine current investment Ix
t and Im
t as describe by the conditions in (30)
and (31).
The Euler equation for investment, (30) and (31), shows clearly the im-





￿t > 1 the economy





￿t < 1 it runs down
capital. For a small open economy, with no constraints to international bor-
rowing, "excessive" growth in investment leads to a build-up of foreign debt.
Hence, it might be desirable to react to Q and to use the policy instrument
i to control P so that investment I is kept within reasonable bounds.
2.1.5 Relative prices, exchange rate pass-through and stickiness




t ; P). The price of export goods is determined exogenously for a small open
economy (P x￿) and its price in domestic currency is P x = SP x￿. The price
of import goods is also determined exogenously for a small open economy
P m￿, but, we assume that price changes are incompletely passed-through
(see Campa and Goldberg (2002) for a study on exchange rate pass-through




t = !(st + p
m￿
t ) + (1 ￿ !)p
m
t￿1 (32)
where ! = 1 indicates complete pass-through of foreign price changes.





























2.1.6 Macroeconomic Conditions And Market Clearing
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The Central Bank adopts practices consistent with optimal control models,
speci￿cally, the linear quadratic regulator problem. It chooses an optimal
interest rate reaction function, given its loss function equation, and its per-
ception of the evolution of the state variables, in￿ ation and growth. The
change in the interest rate is the solution of the optimal linear quadratic
regulator problem,with control variable ￿i solved as a feedback response to
the lagged state variables.
We assume, perhaps more realistically, that the monetary authority does
not know the exact nature of the private sector model, instead it ￿learns￿
and updates the state-space model equation, which underpins its calculation
of the optimal interest rate policy period by period. In other words, at each
period time t, the Central Bank updates its information about the evolution
of in￿ ation and growth, and re-estimates the state-space system to obtain
new estimates The central bank then uses this information to determine the
optimal interest rate.
￿ Pure In￿ ation targeting
In the pure in￿ ation target case, the monetary authority estimates or
￿learns￿the evolution of in￿ ation as a function of its own lag as well as of
changes in the interest rate.






￿1t;j￿t￿j￿1 + ￿2t￿it + et (38)
it+1 = it +
k X
j=0
h(b ￿1t;j;b ￿2t;￿1t)￿t￿j￿1 (39)
where ￿t = log(Pt=Pt￿4); an annualized rate of in￿ ation, ￿￿ is the target for
in￿ ation, and k is the number of lags for forecasting the evolution of the
state variable. The feedback function h is obtained by solving the linear
quadratic regulator problem, as discussed in Sargent (1999).
The weight on the loss function, ￿t = f￿1tg are chosen to re￿ ect the
Central Bank￿ s concerns about in￿ ation and is shown in Table I.
11Table I: Policy Weights
In￿ ation Only Target
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿1 = 0:0
￿ > ￿￿ ￿1 = 1:0
In this pure anti-in￿ ation scenario, if in￿ ation is less than the target level
￿￿; the central bank does not optimize; in other words, the interest rate
remains at its level: it+1 = it: This is the ￿no intervention￿case. However,
if in￿ ation is above the target rate, the monetary authority implements its
optimal interest policy according to equation (39).
￿ In￿ ation and Q-Targets
In this policy scenario, the Central Bank practises in￿ ation targeting as
well as Q-growth targeting, where Qt is the average of Qx
t and Qm
t : In this
case, the monetary authority estimates or ￿learns￿the evolution of in￿ ation
and Q-growth as a function of its own lag as well as of changes in the interest
rate.
￿2 = ￿1t(￿t ￿ ￿
￿)









￿2t;￿t￿j￿1 + ￿3t￿it + et (41)
it+1 = it +
k X
j=0
h(b ￿1t;j;b ￿2t;j;b ￿3t;￿1t;￿2t)xt￿j￿1 (42)
where nt = log(Qt=Qt￿4); the annualized rate of growth of Q, and ￿￿ repre-
sents the target for Q-growth. In this case, we have a bivariate forecasting
model for the evolution of the state variables, ￿t and ￿t, with an equal num-
ber of lags; that is, the coe¢ cient matrix ￿1t;j, for k lags contains two (k￿1)
recursively updated matrix coe¢ cients, representing the e⁄ects of lagged in-
￿ ation and growth on current in￿ ation and growth.
Table II: Policy Weights
In￿ ation Targeting and Q reactions
Q
In￿ ation ￿t ￿ ￿￿ ￿t < ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿1 = 0:1 ￿1 = 0:0
￿2 = 0:9 ￿2 = 0:0
￿ > ￿￿ ￿1 = 0:5 ￿1 = 0:9
￿2 = 0:5 ￿2 = 0:1
12The weights for in￿ ation and output growth in the loss function depend
on the conditions at time t. The weights re￿ ecting the Central Bank￿ s
preference for in￿ ation and growth in this policy scenario are summarized in
Table II. In this second policy scenario, if in￿ ation is below the target level
￿￿ and Q-growth below the target ￿￿, the Central Bank does not change
the policy interest rate. When in￿ ation is below target, but Q-growth is
above target, the monetary authority puts greater weight on Q-growth than
on in￿ ation. In contrast, when in￿ ation is above target and growth is below
target, the central bank puts strong weight on the in￿ ation target. Finally,
if in￿ ation is above its target and growth is above its target, the weights are
set equally at 0.5.
Thus, corresponding to each scenario, the Central Bank optimizes a loss
function ￿ and actively formulates its optimal interest-rate feedback rule. It
also acts at time t as if its estimated model for the evolution of in￿ ation and
output growth is true ￿forever￿ , and that its relative weights for in￿ ation, or
growth in the loss function are permanently ￿xed.
However, as Sargent (1999) points out in a similar model, the monetary
authority￿ s own procedure for re-estimation ￿falsi￿es￿this pretense as it up-
dates the coe¢ cients f￿1t;￿2t;￿3tg; and solves the linear quadratic regulator
problem for a new optimal response ￿rule￿of the interest rate to the evolution
of the state variables at every point of time t:
3 Calibration and Solution Algorithm
In this section we discuss the calibration of parameters, initial conditions,
and stochastic processes for the exogenous variables of the model. We then
summarize the parameterized expectations algorithm (PEA) used for solving
the model.
3.1 Parameters and Initial Conditions
The parameter settings for the model appear in Table III.
Table III: Calibrated Parameters
Consumption ￿ = 1:5 ; ￿ = 0:009
￿x = 0:5; ￿f = 0:5
Production ￿m = 0:7; ￿x = 0:3
￿x = ￿m = 0:025; ￿x = ￿m = 0:03
13Many of the parameter selections follow Mendoza (1995, 2001). The
constant relative risk aversion ￿ is set at 1.5 (to allow for high interest sen-
sitivity). The shares of non-traded goods in overall consumption is set at
0.5, while the shares of exports and imports in traded goods consumption
is 50 percent each. Production in the export goods sector is more capital
intensive than in the import goods sector.
The initial values of the nominal exchange rate, the price of non-tradeables
and the price of importable and exportable goods are normalized at unity
while the initial values for the stock of capital and ￿nancial assets (domestic
and foreign debt) are selected so that they are compatible with the implied
steady state value of consumption, C = 2:02; which is given by the interest






were calculated on the basis of the preference parameters in the sub-utility
functions and the initial values of B and L￿ deduced.
Similarly, the initial shadow price of capital for each sector is set at its
steady state value. The production function coe¢ cients Am and Ax; along
with the initial values of capital for each sector, are chosen to ensure that
the marginal product of capital in each sector is equal to the real interest
plus depreciation, while the level of production meets demand in each sector.
Since the focus of the study is on the e⁄ects of terms of trade shocks, the
domestic productivity coe¢ cients were ￿xed for all the simulations.
Finally, the foreign interest rate i￿ is also ￿xed at the annual rate of 0:04:
In the simulations, the e⁄ect of initialization is mitigated by discarding the
￿rst 100 simulated values.
3.2 Terms of Trade Shocks




















where lower case denotes the logs of the respective prices. The evolution of
the prices mimic actual data generating processes, namely that the variable
is a unit-root autoregressive process, with a normally distributed innovation
with standard deviation set at 0.01. The errors are assumed to be indepen-
dent at this stage.
The simulations are also conducted assuming that the domestic price of
export goods fully re￿ ect the exogenously determined prices:
p
x
t = st + p
x￿
t (43)
14however, the domestic price of import goods are partially passed on:
p
m
t = !(st + p
m￿
t ) + (1 ￿ !)p
m
t￿1 (44)
where ! is the coe¢ cient of exchange rate pass-through, here set at 0.4.
Thus, this is a simulation study about the design of monetary policy for
an economy subjected to relative price shocks. The log of the terms of trade
(j) and the aggregate consumption price de￿ ator (p) becomes respectively:
j = st + p
x￿
t ￿ !(st + p
m￿






t ) + (1 ￿ ￿x)
￿
!(st + pm￿
t ) + (1 ￿ !)pm
t￿1
￿




t ￿ ￿f ln(￿f) + (￿f ￿ 1)ln(1 ￿ ￿f)
In our model, there are only two sources of stickiness, one from incomplete
pass through, and the other from the Central Bank learning. The only noise
comes from the terms of trade shocks. The rate of growth of Q captures the
shadow price of installed capital and does not represent a "misalignment" in
any sense.
3.3 Solution Algorithm and Constraints
Following Marcet (1988, 1993), Den Haan and Marcet (1990, 1994), and
Du⁄y and McNelis (2001), the approach of this study is to parameterize the









0(Ct) =  
C(xt￿1;￿C) (45)
= Et#t+1U
0(Ct+1)(1 + it ￿ ￿t+1)
st =  
S(xt￿1;￿S) (46)





















































The symbol xt￿1 represents a vector of observable instrumental variables
known at time t￿ the variables are: consumption of import Cm and export
goods Cx, the marginal utility of consumption ￿, the real interest rate r, the
real exchange rate, Z, and the shadow prices of replacement capital for the




x ￿ Cx;￿ ￿ ￿;r ￿ r;Z ￿ Z;Q
m ￿ Qm;Q
x ￿ Qxg (49)
The symbols ￿￿;￿S;￿Qx, and ￿Qm represent the parameters for the expecta-






are the expectation approximation
functions.
Judd (1996) classi￿es this approach as a ￿projection￿or a ￿weighted resid-
ual￿method for solving functional equations, and notes that the approach
was originally developed by Williams and Wright (1982, 1984, 1991). The




; and  
Qf
are usually second-order polyno-
mial expansions [see, for example, Den Haan and Marcet (1994)]. However,
Du⁄y and McNelis (2001) have shown that neural networks can produce
results with greater accuracy for the same number of parameters, or equal
accuracy with fewer parameters, than the second-order polynomial approxi-
mation.
The model was simulated for repeated parameter values for f￿C; ￿S;
￿Qx; ￿Qmg and convergence obtained when the expectational errors were
16minimized. In the algorithm, the following non-negativity constraints for
consumption and the stocks of capital were imposed:
C
x
t > 0; K
x
t > 0; K
m
t > 0 (50)
The latter was achieved by assuming irreversible investment for capital in
























The usual no-Ponzi game applies to the evolution of real government debt









￿(i￿+￿st+1)t = 0 (52)
We keep the foreign asset or foreign debt to GDP ratio bounded, and thus
ful￿ll the transversality condition, by imposing the following constraints on











< e B (53)
where e L; and e B are the critical foreign and domestic debt ratios. In the
simulation, the ￿scal authority will exact lump sum taxes from non-traded
goods sector in order to run a surplus and ￿buy back￿domestic debt if it
grows above a critical foreign or domestic debt/GDP ratio.
4 Simulation Analysis
4.1 Impulse-Response Analysis
Before proceeding to the full stochastic simulations, we ￿rst examine some
dynamic properties of the model with impulse-response analysis. The model
was set at its steady-state initial conditions and we assume that the mone-
tary authorities simply set the interest rate at the steady state international
interest rate.
6See Pacharoni (2003) for a suggestion for solving investment equations under parame-
terized expectations with irreversibility restrictions.
7In the PEA algorithm, the error function will be penalized if the foreign debt/gdp
ratio is violated. Thus, the coe¢ cients for the optimal decision rules will yield debt/gdp
ratios which are well belows levels at which the constaint becomes binding.
17Figure 1: Impulse Response Functions to a Temporary Terms of Trade Shock
The model was then subjected to a one-period only terms of trade shock.
This was achieved by letting the process for the world price of exports, px￿
increase by one standard deviation (px￿
t = px￿+0:01; t = T ￿) and then letting
it revert back to its steady-state value thereafter (px￿
t = px￿; t 6= T ￿); the
price for imported goods, pm￿
t remains at its steady-state value (pm￿
t = pm￿).
In e⁄ect, the terms of trades jumps at T ￿ from its steady-state value of 1.00
to 1.0101 and then reverts back to its steady state value.
The e⁄ects of the shock on the economy accords with standard theory.
Overall, there will be no real change and the e⁄ects of the temporary terms
of trade shock are dissipated within four quarters. Figure 1 pictures the
adjustment for three key variables, real exchange rate depreciation, the cur-
rent account, and the rate of growth of Tobin￿ s Q. The variables oscillate
re￿ ecting the reversal e⁄ects of the temporary shock. The strongest e⁄ects
take place after the shock in period 1, but the system stabilises quickly.
Consistent with Mendoza (1995) empirical ￿ndings, we see that terms
18Figure 2: One realization of the terms of trade shocks
of trade e⁄ects have positive e⁄ects both on the current account and on
the real exchange rate. [Mendoza (1995): p. 102]. However, the terms
of trade increase also leads to an increase in the value of Q (see the Euler
equation for the export goods which highlights the role of the export price on
future marginal productivities). This result provides yet another reason for
monitoring Q - changes in Q are indicators of developments in the current
account, when economies are driven by terms of trade shocks.
4.2 Base-Line Results
The aim of the simulations, of course, is to compare the outcome for in￿ ation,
growth and welfare for the two policy scenarios - in￿ ation targeting (￿) and
in￿ ation and Q-growth targeting (￿ and ￿). To ensure that the results
are robust, we conducted 1000 simulations (each containing a time-series of
realizations of terms of trade shocks).
Figure 1 shows the simulated paths for one time series realization of the
exogenous terms of trade index. This particular realization of the terms of
trade shocks describes the case when there are improvements (upward trend)
and deteriorations (downward trend), but where there are no export booms
(almost all values are below one).
The simulated values for the key variables (in￿ ation, consumption, invest-
ment, current account) are well-behaved. Figure 2 presents the evolution of
these variables for the two scenarios. In general, despite the large swings in
the terms of trade index, consumption is remarkably stable. But the intro-
duction of Q-growth targeting for the monetary authority results in a lower
level of consumption and investment. And more interestingly, the current
19Figure 3: Time Series
20account exhibits less ￿ uctuations from surplus to de￿cits.
To ascertain which policy regime yields the higher welfare value, we exam-
ined the distribution of the welfare outcomes of the di⁄erent policy regimes
for 1000 di⁄erent realizations of the terms of trade shocks. Before presenting
these results, we evaluated the accuracy of the simulation results as well as
the "rationality" of the learning mechanism.
4.3 Den Haan-Marcet Accuracy Test
The accuracy of the simulations is checked by the Den Haan-Marcet statistic,
originally developed for the parameterized expectations solution algorithm
but applicable to other procedures as well. This test makes use of the Euler
equation for consumption, under the assumption that with accurate expecta-
tions, the path of consumption would be optimal, so that expectational term









To test whether vt is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, Den Haan and
Marcet propose a transformation of ￿t which has a chi-squared distribution
under the hypothesis of accuracy. If the value of this statistic belongs to the
upper or lower critical region of the chi-squared distribution, Den Haan and
Marcet suggest that this is evidence ￿against the accuracy of the solution￿ .
[Den Haan and Marcet (1994): p. 5].
Table IV presents the percentage of realizations (out of 1000) in which
the Den Haan-Marcet statistics fell in the upper or lower critical regions of
the chi-squared distribution, for each policy regime.
Table IV: Distribution of Den-Haan Marcet Statistic
Percentage in Upper/Lower Critical Region
Policy Regime
In￿ ation Targeting 0.045/0.061
In￿ ation/Q Growth Targeting 0.045/0.020
4.4 Learning and Quasi-Rationality
In our model, the central bank learns the underlying process for in￿ ation
in the pure in￿ ation-target regime and the underlying processes for in￿ ation
21and growth in the in￿ ation-growth target regime. The learning takes place
by updating recursively the least-squares estimates of a vector autoregressive
model. Learning is thus a source of stickiness in the model.
Marcet and Nicolini (1997) raise the issue of reasonable rationality re-
quirements in their discussion of recurrent hyperin￿ ations and learning be-
havior. In our model, a similar issue arises. Given that the only shocks in
the model are recurring terms of trade shocks, with no abrupt, unexpected
structural changes taking place, neither to the stochastic shock process nor to
the deep parameters of the model, the learning behavior of the central bank
should not depart, for too long, from the rational expectations paths. The
central bank, after a certain period of time, should develop forecasts which
converge to the true in￿ ation and growth paths of the economy, unless we
wish to make some special assumption about monetary authority behavior.
Marcet and Nicolini discuss the concepts of ￿asymptotic rationality￿ ,
￿epsilon-delta rationality￿and ￿internal consistency￿ , as criteria for ￿bound-
edly rational￿ solutions. They draw attention to the work of Bray and
Savin (1996). These authors examine whether the learning model rejects
serially uncorrelated prediction errors between the learning model and the
rational expectations solution, with the use of the Durbin-Watson statistic.
Marcet and Nicolini point out that the Bray-Savin method carries the ￿ avor
of ￿epsilon-delta￿ rationality in the sense that it requires that the learn-
ing schemes be consistent ￿even along the transition￿[Marcet and Nicolini
(1997): p.16, footnote 22].
Following Bray and Savin, we use the Durbin-Watson statistic to examine
whether the learning behavior is ￿boundedly rational￿ . Table V gives the
Durbin-Watson statistics for the in￿ ation and Q-growth forecast errors of
the central bank, under both policy regimes. In the majority of cases, we
see that the learning behavior does not violate the requirements of bounded
rationality for in￿ ation. However, there is evidence that learning is not
boundedly rational for Q-growth, since the implied evolution of Q-in￿ ation
is not easily captured by our vector-autoregressive learning model.
Table V: Durbin-Watson Statistics for Forecast Errors
Percentage in Lower and Upper Critical Region
Policy Regime In￿ ation Q-Growth
In￿ ation Targeting 0.00/0.00
In￿ ation/ Q-Growth Targeting 0.002/0.00 0.00/0.29
224.5 Comparative Welfare Results
This section summarizes the results for 1000 alternate realizations of the
terms-of-trade shocks (each realization contains 150 observations). Table VI
presents the ￿rst two moments of the 1000 sample means for consumption,
in￿ ation, growth, the changes in the policy instrument - the interest rate - and
the intertemporal welfare index (based on the discounted utility function).8
Figure 3 presents the kernel estimates of the distribution of the sample
means from each of the 1000 realizations for in￿ ation, consumption, invest-
ment and the relative welfare measure. The solid lines are for the case with
in￿ ation targeting, while the dashed lines are for the in￿ ation and Q-growth
targeting scenarios. The distributions show rather sharply that managing
Q and in￿ ation does not have much e⁄ect on in￿ ation, while it reduces con-
siderably the volatility of consumption (and hence welfare). These results
show that the "gain" from including Q-growth as a monetary target lies in
the reduction of volatility.
Table VI: Summary Statistics (1000 Simulations)
First and Second Moments (in Parenthesis) of the sample means
Policy Regimes
￿ ￿;￿
Consumption (c) 1.939 (0.024) 1.904 (0.004)
Investment (inv) 0.896 (0.001) 0.732 (0.001)
In￿ ation Rate (￿)% 0.006 (0.035) 0.004 (0.211)
GDP Growth Rate (￿)% -0.009 (0.048) 0.001 (0.006)
Welfare (W) -132.240 (1.304) -134.409 (0.234)
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has shown that there are clear trade-o⁄s when the rate of growth
of Tobin￿ s Q is incorporated as an additional target to in￿ ation targeting
in the conduct of monetary policy. Our results show that the Central Bank
can achieve a great deal of success if it adopts this additional target, for
8We do not benchmark the welfare e⁄ects with respect to the steady state welfare, since
the terms of trade realizations may lead to welfare outcomes either greater or less than
the steady state welfare.
23Figure 4: Distributions
24reducing Q volatility while maintaining about the same degree of in￿ ation
volatility. However, across a range of realizations of terms of trade shocks,
the welfare e⁄ects, measured in terms of the present value of consumption
utility, are lower when Q-growth targets are incorporated with the in￿ ation
targets. Overall, the trade-o⁄ for monetary policy is clear: either a slightly
higher mean welfare and high volatility or lower mean welfare and lower
volatility.
The addition of Q-growth targets thus reduces the volatility of the welfare
measure. Compared to a strict in￿ ation targeting regime, monetary policy
with in￿ ation and Q-growth targets can marginally insulate an economy from
adverse terms-of-trade shocks since growth and welfare measures do not fall
as much when negative shocks are realized.
To be sure, we did not introduce "shocks" in this model in the form of
asset price bubbles, or misalighments of the targeting share price from the
fundamental Q value. We assumed that the driving force for Q growth comes
from fundamentals. Given that the central bank has to learn the laws of
motion of Q-growth as well as in￿ ation, and set policy on the basis of longer-
term laws of motion of these variables, it seems reasonable to start with Q
driven solely by fundamentals. We leave to further research an examination
of the robustness of our results to the incorporation of bubbles and other
non-fundamental asset-price shocks.
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